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Uniform Commercial Code-Commercial Paper
Part II-Transfer and Negotiation
ROSS C. TISDALE*

In a previous article' the writer undertook the task of
outlining briefly the changes to be wrought in existing law
by the proposed Uniform Commercial Code in relation to the
subject of negotiable instruments. The present paper is a
continuation of that study and will deal with the transfer and
negotiation of commercial paper, which are governed by
Part 2, Article 3, of the Uniform Commercial Code. While
Part 2 is quite brief, and deals chiefly with the mechanics of
transfer and negotiation, some important changes in the law
have been proposed.
TRANSFER: RIGHT TO INDORSEMENT'

The first section of Part 2,' combines the provisions of
§§ 27,' 49,' and 58,' of the N.I.L., and deals with transfers involving other than technical negotiations. One of the purposes of
the section is to incorporate expressly in the Code fundamental principles of property and contract law widely recognized in existing case law.
For example, the gift cases illustrate the proposition that
delivery with donative intent passes title even to an order
instrument not properly indorsed.' Clearly the transferee for
value should fare as well, and in either type of transfer the
*

2

3

Professor of Law, University of North Dakota.
Tisdale, Uniform Commercial Code Commercial Paper, 26 N.D. Bar
Briefs 252 (July, 1950).
All references are to the Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, Text Edition, Spring, 1951. To conserve space the present Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act will be cited "N.I.L." and the proposed code
as "U.C.C."
U.C.C. § 3-201. -(1) Transfer of an instrument vests in the transferee
such rights as the transferor has therein, except that a transferee who has
himself been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or
who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against it cannot
improve his position by taking from a later holder in due course.
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instrument vests the foregoing
rights in the transferee to the extent of the interest transferred.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value of an instrument not
then payable to bearer gives the transferee the specifically enforceable
right to have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. Negotiation
takes effect only when the indorsement is made and until that time there
is no presumption that the transferee is the owner."
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0304 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0420 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0508 (1943).
Rothwell v. Taylor, 303 Ill. 226, 135 N.E. 419 (1922).
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transferee has property rights which he can pass on to third
parties.' This section makes it clear that a transferor need not
be a holder by providing that "Transfer of an instrument vests
in the transferee such rights as the transferor had therein...
Unfortunately the language of the N.I.L. does not clearly
require the results outlined above. By providing that "...
Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it . . .",§49"° of the N.I.L.
makes it possible to draw at least two negative inferences:
first, a mere transferee cannot pass on his rights; second, a
donee gets no title if he takes by transfer. While some
authorities exist which lend support to each of these propositions, North Dakota law would appear to be contra," and the
Code definitely rejects both positions."
This section of the Code draws a clear line between the
substantive and procedural rights of a holder as contrasted
with those of a mere transferee-again a distinction not too
clearly indicated in the N.I.L., but clearly defined in case law.
Thus §5114 of the N.I.L. permits a holder to sue in his own
name, §5711 frees him of all but real defenses, and § 5918 provides
that every holder is ". . . deemed prima facie to be a holder
in due course..." Obviously no such presumption will arise
from the fact of possession by a mere transferee since the
instrument indicates on its face that title is in a third party,
Section 49 of the N.I.L. would appear to vest title in the transferee, and
having title he is entitled to sue in his own name. An "ourselves" note
illustrates the problem nicely. Although the N.I.L. requires indorsement to
complete such an instrument, yet the weight of authority considers that a
transferee may sue. Cassetta v. Banna, 106 Cal.App. 196, 288 Pac. 830
(1930); Armato v. Ross, 170 So. 400 (La.App.1936). Cf. People's State
Bank v. Snyder, 50 N.D. 234, 195 N.W. 436 (1923).
9
Note 3, supra. Section 49 of the N.I.L. makes the title pass. The U.C.C.
substitutes rights-a more inclusive term.
10 N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0420 (1943).
U That indorsement is necessary to pass title to an order instrument see:
Moore v. Moore, 35 Ga.App. 39, 131 S.E. 922 (1926) Bond v. Maxwell,
40 Ga.App. 679, 150 S.E. 860 (1929). Contra, Cosmopolitan Trust Co.
v. Leonard Watch Co., 249 Mass. 14, 143 N.E. 827 (1924). That an oral
assignment of a note to an agent for collection makes him the real party
in interest, see: Hagge v. Drew, 73 CalApp.2d 739, 167 P.2d 263 (1946);
Nisewanger v. W. J. Lane Co., 75 N.D. 448, 28 N.W.2d 409 (1947).
There is some authority supporting the first negative inference. Simon v.
Mintz, 51 Misc. 670, 101 N.Y.Supp. 86 (1906). Cf. Kiel Wooden Ware
Co. v. Laun, 233 Wis.559, 290 N.W. 214 (1940). Contra, cases cited
Note 8, suppra.
22 See note 11, supra, and Baird v. Chamberlain, 60 N.D. 784, 236 N.W.
724 (1931).
The code substitutes "rights" for "title" of the transferor, and no longer
requires that it be a transfer for value. U.C.C. § 3-201 (1).
1, N.D. Rev. Code § 41,0501 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41,0507 (1943).
z
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0509 (1943).
'
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and one who may not be a party to the suit. While there is
some authority that possession raises a presumption of ownership as against the obligor," the better view is that the burden
rests on the transferee to allege and prove his title, and the
North Dakota cases so hold.' Hence the Code, after giving the
transferee a specifically enforceable right to an unqualified
indorsement,"' concludes: "Negotiation takes effect only when
the indorsement is made and until that time there is no
presumption that the transferee is the owner."'
Another important clarification of the law found in this
section involves the "shelter" clause in § 58' of the N.I.L., and
incorporated here because it deals with the rights of a transferee. This section provides that "a holder who derives his
title through a holder in due course, and who is not himself
a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument, has
all the rights of such former holder in respect of all parties
prior to the latter."
The bona fide purchaser doctrine has a special application
in the field of negotiable paper. To insure a free market for
commercial paper, we protect one who claims through a holder
in due course." But when the rights of a re-acquirer are in
question we face a question of policy-if the re-acquirer has
participated in the fraud we cannot permit him to take advantage of the shelter clause.
Clearly, if the payee was subject to the defense of fraud
or other equitable defense, he should be remitted to his
former rights, since it would be inequitable to permit him to
pass the instrument on to a holder in due course and thus
1?

2
=
'

Manhattan Chamber of Commerce v. G'allagher, 123 Kan. 155, 254 Pac.
345 (1927); Southwest General Electric Company v. Riddle, 66 Okla. 202,
168 Pac. 436 (1917). Cf. Baird v. Perry, 56 N.D. 594, 218 N.W. 229
(1928).
Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N.D. 249, 83 N.W. 20 (1900); Williams v. Clark,
42 N.D. 107, 172 N.W. 825 (1919).
U.C.C. § 3-201 (3) applies only to transfers for value. A donee is not
entitled to an indorsement under this section. Section 49 of the N.I.L. has
the same limitation. The only change is that the right is now to become
enforceable in equity.
U.C.C. § 3-201 (3).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0508 (1943).
"This doctrine rests on the following considerations: When negotiable
paper comes into the hands of a holder in due course, that person takes
title free from all equities existing between prior parties. In order that he
may be given the full commercial benefits of that complete ownership, and
have the whole world as a market, the law usually permits him to transfer without reservation all of his rights, powers, privileges and immunities
to any transferee normally, therefore, his immunities from prior equities
must continue in favor of his transferee, otherwise the marketability of
his paper would be seriously restricted." Note, 1 N.C.L.Rev. 187-191
(1923).
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cleanse it of a defense of which he had full knowledge.' If,
however, the payee negotiates to a holder in due course who
transfers without indorsement, the transferee receives the full
benefit of the shelter clause despite knowledge of the defense
and whether or not he gave value." This is the bona fide
purchaser principle in its essence-but can clearly be distinguished from the case of the re-acquirer. After all the transferee simply took advantage of the good fortune of another,
and his act has in no way worsened the position of the obligor.
But the re-acquirer, with notice of the fraud when he took
the instrument, has attempted to better his position by passing
it on. Essentially the question is, whether a holder with notice
becomes a party to the fraud by shooting the instrument thru
a holler in due course." The Code takes the view that a holder
"who as a prior holder had notice of a defense or claim against
it cannot improve his position by taking from a later holder
in due course."' The clause clears up any possible doubt that
it is fraud to try to wipe out the effect of notice." Of course it
still remains true that a holder in due course re-acquiring the
instrument takes free of defenses.'
This section combines in one section of the Code three
widely separated sections of the N.I.L. which deal with the
rights of a transferee. It makes it clear that rights pass on
transfer-all the rights that the transferor had-and this of
course covers a transfer of a limited security interest." The
net effect appears to be a clear improvement over the N.I.L.
and involves no radical change in existing law.
23

'

Britton, Bills and Notes § 124 (1943); Beutel's Brannan Negotiable Instruments Law § 58, p. 855 et seq. (7th ed.1948); Note, 54 L.R.A. 673
(1902).
See note 22, supra.
In view of the holding that a taker with notice from a holder in due course
takes free of defenses, it is arguable that § 58 of the N.I.L. would permit
a reacquiring holder who first took with notice to recover free of defenses.
There is authority to this effect. See Horan v. Mason, 141 App.Div. 89,
125 N.Y.Supp. 668 (1910).

U.C.C. § 3-201 (1).

The cases are not agreed on the theory which prevents recovery by a reacquiring party who took with notice. Some authorities hold that a maker
compelled to pay the note to a holder in due course has a cause of action
against the payee. Gates v. Ritchie, 162 Ark. 484, 258 S.W. 397 (1924);
Patterson & Co. v. Peterson, 15 Ga.App. 680, 84 S.E. 163 (1915). Contra,
Dickinson v. Carroll, 21 N.D 271, 130 N.W. 829 (1911).
Section 48 of the N.I.L. permits a former holder to strike out any indorsement not necessary to his title. The effect of this, of course, is to discharge that party and all parties subsequent to him. This restores the
reacquirer to the position he held originally. If a holder in due course
then, he remains a holder in due course despite subsequent notice. The
statute has its application where the reacquirer seeks to improve his position by relying on the title of a later indorser in point of time.
Baird v. Chamberlain, 60 N.D. 784, 236 N.W. 724 (1931).
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NEGOTIATION

Section 3-202"' of the Code combines and rewords sections
30,", 31" and 32" of the N.I.L. While § 1 of Part II deals with
transfers, the second section deals with a special kind of transfer-negotiation is a transfer that results in making the transferee a holder. Thus no change in existing law is envisaged,
merely a rearrangement and clarification of the provisions of
the N.I.L. It still remains true that a bearer instrument, or
one where the only or last indorsement is in blank and all
prior special indorsements are in order, is transferable by
delivery. On the other hand, a special indorsement controls
even where the instrument is bearer paper on its face, a
point to be taken up later."
The Code follows the N.I.L. in requiring indorsement on
the instrument or on a paper firmly affixed thereto for the
purpose of receiving indorsements. It rejects the adequacy
of any attempted indorsement of an accompanying document
attached to the note such as a contract or mortgage, etc.'5
In accord with existing law, the statute expressly states
that "An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the
holder" . . . thus setting out expressly in the statute a -principle
familiar to all but set out. only inferentially in the N.I.L."
Section 32 of the N.I.L.' requires an indorsement of the
entire interest of the holder and does not permit a partial
assignment to operate as a negotiation. The Code continues
U.C.C." § 3-202. "Negotiation. (1) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by delivery with any necessary
indorsement; if payable to bearer it is negotiated by delivery.
(2) An indorsement must be written by or on behalf of the holder and
on the instrument or on a paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a
part thereof.
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation only when it conveys
the entire instrument or any unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less
it operates only as a partial assignment.
(4) Words of assignment, condition, waiver, guaranty, limitation or
disclaimer of liability and the like accompanying an indorsement do not
affect its character as an indorsement.'"
"
N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0401 (1943).
32
N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0402 (1943).
n N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0403 (1943).
84
U.C.C. § 3-204, infra note 45.
u Bergmann v. Puhl, 105 Wis. 120, 217 N.W. 746 (1928).
U.C.C. § 3,302 (2), note 30, supra.
"
See N.D. Rev. Code § 1-0149 (5) (1943): ",Signature' or 'Subscription'
shall include 'Mark' when the person cannot write, his name being written
near it and written by a person who writes his own name as a witness."
That this section is of general application, see Montague v. Street, 59 N.D.
618, 231 N.W. 728 (1930).
N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0403 (1943).
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this rule by stating that "an indorsement is effective for
negotiation only when it conveys the entire instrument or any
unpaid residue. If it purports to be of less it operates only as a
partial assignment."" The phrase "which purports to transfer
the instrument to two or more indorsees severally . . ."' is
omitted as superfluous since covered in other portions of the
Code. It is a proper procedure to indorse to A and B as tenants
in common. An instrument payable to A or B is payable to
either, and the same rule should govern on indorsement.'
Subsection three of the Code is new, but states a well
recognized rule-that the addition of "words of assignment,
condition, waiver, guaranty, limitation or disclaimer of liability . . . do not affect its sufficiency for negotiation. This
does not represent a change in North Dakota law so far as
words of guaranty are concerned.'
Section 43" of the N.I.L. provides: "Where the name of
a payee or indorsee is wrongly designated or misspelled, he
may indorse the instrument as therein described, adding, if
he think it fit, his proper signature." Sec. 3-202" rewords this
section but makes no change in the law. The change in
language is to make it clear that while indorsement in either
the erroneous designation, or in the holder's correct name
would be sufficient to pass title, the purchaser has a right to
demand both signatures. Undoubtedly that corresponds with
sound commercial practice.

43

4

U.C.C. § 3,302 (3), note 30, supra.
N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0403 (1943).
Cf. U.C.C. § 3-117 and N.I.L. § 41.
Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N.D. 414, 67 N.W. 293 (1896). The indorsement
in that case read: "For value received, I hereby guarantee the within note,
waiving notice or protest and demand." The remarks of Corliss J., are
enlightening: "On the other hand it is elementary that the indorser may
enlarge his liability without destroying the right of his indorsee to protection as an innocent purchaser. By waiving demand and notice, he
changes a conditional liability into an absolute one. Yet, although such
a waiver is made, the indorsee can claim the same exemption from the
interposition of defenses to the paper that he could have claimed had
there been no waiver. It is therefore apparent that the inquiry whether one
is an indorsee of negotiable paper does not depend upon the question
whether the person negotiating it has incurred the precise obligation of
an indorser. He may incur more liability, or less liability, or no liability
at all; and yet the purchaser may be an indorsee, and protected as such.
Nor is the form of the indorsement material. It is an indorsement, although
it is in terms an assignment." 5 N.D. 414, 417-18, 67 N.W. 293, 294. Cf.
Britton, Bills and Notes § 58, p. 230 et seq. (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0414 (1943).
U.C.C. § 3-203. "Where an instrument is made payable to a person under
a misspelled name or one other than his own he may indorse in that name
or his own or both; but signature in both names may be required by a
person paying or giving value for the instrument."

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
SPECIAL INDORSEMENT; BLANK INDORSEMENT.

Section 3-204 " of the Code covers material found in § 9 (5),'
33," 34,' 35," and 40" of the N.I.L. The important change to
be noted here is the omission of § 35, and the introduction of
the idea that the holder of paper has a right to indorse
specially, altho the paper is bearer on its face.
Consider first the omission. Section 35 of the N.I.L.
gave the holder power to "convert a blank indorsement into
a special indorsement by writing over the signature of the
indorser in blank any contract consistent with the character
of the indorsement."" In practice the rule against material
alterations limited this special privilege to one type of casea holder under a blank indorsement by a prior party, could
write in the name of a purchaser as special indorsee without
signing his own name. Under the Code this is still possible,
but the drafters thought that Section 35 might be confusing
and an inducement to attempted alterations that are not
authorized-as writing in "payment guaranteed" or "protest
waived"--clearly material alterations of the indorser's contract." The omission does not destroy existing rights of any
importance. It still remains true that one may indorse without
recourse, and if he is an agent, disclaim all liability. He may
still write in the name of a special indorsee over a blank
indorsement without signing his own name.
The second important change is the reversal of the rule
found in § 40 of the N.I.L. that "Where an instrument, payable
to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may nevertheless be further
negotiated by delivery . . ."" A suggested reason for the rule,
adopted in the N.I.L. from the common law, was that the
contract of the promisor was to pay the bearer, and to hold
that a special indorsement controlled would alter that contract
U.C.C. § 3-204. "'(1) A special indorsement specifies the person to whom
or to whose order it makes the instrument payable. Any instrument specially indorsed becomes payable to the order of the special indorsee and.
may be further negotiated only by his indorsement.
(2) An indorsement in blank specifies no particular indorsee and may
consist of a mere signature. An instrument payable to order and indorsed
in blank becomes payable to bearer and may be negotiated by delivery
alone until specially indorsed, or indorsed for collection."
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0209 (5) (1943).
47 N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0404 (1943).
a N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0405 (1943).
49 N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0406 (1943).
'
N.D. Rev. Code § 41,0411 (1943).
51 Note 45, supra. The language of the code applies to "any instrument specially indorsed."
Sawyer State Bank v. Sutherland, 36 N.D. 493, 162 N.W. 696 (1917).
Note 50, supra.
N
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and throw the risk of forgery upon him-a risk he did not
assume under his contract.'
However, the drafters of the Code felt that the rights of
the holder overbalanced the risk to the maker or drawer. The
holder under the code now has the right to control who shall
be entitled to receive payment by naming a special indorsee,
and his indorsement is required as evidence of the satisfaction
of the obligation. Since the law as to order instruments is
that a blank indorsement makes the instrument payable to
bearer, and such an indorsement can again be converted into
a special, or by a subsequent special indorsement, the contract
again becomes a promise to pay to order, the change is not as
serious in practice as would appear at first blush. Certainly
a practice exists in business circles of asking for the indorsement of the holder of bearer paper before purchase, and if the
indorsement is special it would not be consistent with sound
practice to take the instrument without requiring the indorsement of the special indorsee. On the whole the change does
not seem unreasonable."
CONDITIONAL INDORSEMENT PROHIBITING TRANSFER.

Section 3-205' of the Code covers the material governed
by §39"' of the N.I.L., and dissects Section 37,' by putting a
new construction on an indorsement which prohibits further
negotiation of the instrument under subdivision (1) of that
section. It is here that we find an important departure from
familiar law. The Code abolishes the term "restrictive" for
reasons to be set out later; and this section converts one type
of restrictive indorsement into a conditional indorsement.
We do not have too many examples of a true conditional
indorsement."' At common law a conditional indorsement was
a trap for the unwary. Such an indorsement not only limited
the right of the conditional indorsee to proceed against the
conditional indorser,"' but also made it impossible for the
5

Britton, Bills and Notes 245-46 (1943).
Another change here extends the indorser's liability to a remote holder.
Under Section 40, a subsequent holder could not sue unless he took by
indorsement from the special indorsee. U.C.C. § 3-417 (2).
U.C.C. § 3-205. "Neither a conditional indorsement nor one purporting
to prohibit further transfer of the instrument prevents its further transfer
or negotiation, and the transferee may enforce payment in disregard of the
limitation; but the indorsee and any other subsequent transferee except a
collecting or payor bank takes the instrument or its proceeds subject to
any rights of the indorser."

5 N.D. Rev. Code § 41,0410 (1943).
s N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0407 (1943).
"
'

See Smith v. Shaw, 16 N.D. 306, 112 N.W. 1062 (1907).
Randles v. Gully, 128 Okla. 220, 262 Pac. 201 (1927).
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payor safely to pay the holder at maturity"b -since the payor
ran the risk that the condition might not have been fulfilled'
The drafters of the negotiable instruments law felt this to be
unreasonable'--hence § 39 changed the common law giving
the payor the protection he needed-the right to pay the bill
,regardless of the condition. Thus the holder alone remained
responsible to the indorser for the fulfilment of the condition.
This section, then, retains the substance of § 39, as to the
effect of a conditional indorsement, and adds a new elementunder the Code an indorsement that purports to prohibit
further transfer of the instrument is to be construed as conditional. It loses its effect so far as its prohibitory force is
concerned, and is to be construed as an ordinary conditional
indorsement. Thus, "Pay A only" is to be construed as if it
read, "Pay A on condition he does not transfer."" Obviously,
anyone purchasing an instrument with such an indorsement
cannot take as a holder in due course." The statute, however,
makes one exception to this. In recognition of the fact that
the indorser contemplates further transfer of the instrument
for the purpose of collection, the effect of an indorsement "pay
A only" as notice of the rights of the indorser, is cut off when
the instrument passes into the hands of a bank or group of
banks for the purpose of collection. Incidentally, such an
indorsement does not have the effect of an indorsement for
collection or deposit. There the customer's bank-the depositary bank-is on notice that the purpose of the indorsement
was to create an agency for collection. Subsequent banks
under such an indorsement should be holders in due course,
in a proper case, since the instrument came to them through
collection channels, and not from a private holder." Under
this section of the Code the depositary bank also may become
a holder in due course because the indorsement "pay A only"
no longer is treated as restrictive.
5'b Robertson v. Kensington, 4 Taunt. 30 (1811).
d "Commissioners' Note: The first sentence is the same as Section 33 of the
Bills of Exchange Act with a slight modification. In his note to that section Judge Chalmers says: 'This section alters the law. It was formerly that
if a bill was indorsed conditionally, the acceptor paid it at his peril if the
condition was not fulfilled. This was hard on him. If he dishonored the
bill he might be liable to damages, and yet it might be impossible for him
to find out if the conditions had been fulfilled . . ."Beutel's Brannan
Negotiable Instruments Law 25 (6th ed. 1938).
61 The meaning of N.I.L. § 36 (1) is not dear. Section 37 (3) provides: "A
restrictive indorsement confers upon the indorsee the right: . . . (3) to
transfer his rights as such indorsee, where the form of the indorsement
authorizes him to do so." The implication is that some forms of indorsement might restrict further transfer. The cases give no satisfactory answer.
See Power v. Finnie, 4 Call. 411 (Va.1797); Rive v. Stearns, 3 Mass
225, 3 Am.Dec. 129 (1807).
'

Note 56, supra.
Discussed in the next section. See Note 64, infra.
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Because of the obscurity surrounding this form of indorsement, the solution offered here seems logical and workable.
The net effect is that a subsequent taker becomes a holder,
but not in due course unless the instrument is in the collection
process.
INDORSEMENT "FOR COLLECTION", "FOR DEPOSIT",
To AGENT OR IN TRUST

This section of the Code deals with a narrow but confused
area in transfers of commercial paper. It combines the material
found in §§ 36' and 37" and omits § 47' of the N.I.L. Section 36
of the N.I.L. provides:
"An indorsement is restrictive, which either:
(1) Prohibits further negotiation of the instrument
or
(2) Constitutes the indorsee the agent of the
indorser; or
(3) Vests the title in the indorsee in trust for or
to the use of some other person ..
Section 36 (1) is illustrated by the form "Pay A Only"; § 36 (2)
by the form, "Pay A for collection or remittance", or "Pay A
for my account," etc. It differs from § 36 (1) in that it does not
purport to prevent further transfer of the instrument, and
creates an agency relationship. Section 36 (3), "Pay A for
the use of X, or in trust for X", differs from (1) and (2) by
naming a special indorsee who takes title for the benefit of
some person other than the indorser or indorsee.
Section 36 (1) is treated as a conditional indorsement
U.C.C. § 3-206. "When an indorsement, whether blank or special, states
that it is 'for collection', 'for deposit', or otherwise for the benefit or account or use of the indorser or of another person:
(a) the first taker under that indorsement must apply any value given
by him for or on the security of the instrument in the manner and to the
person or account directed by the indorsement;
(b) to the extent that he does so he becomes a holder for value;
(c) later holders for value are not affected by the direction contained in
the indorsement unless they have reasonable grounds to believe that a
fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in breach of duty.
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0407 (1943).
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0408 (1943): "A restrictive indorsement confers
upon the indorsee the right:
1. To receive payment of the instrument;
2. To bring any action thereon that the endorser could bring;
3. To transfer his rights as such endorsee, where the form of the endorsement authorizes him to do so.
But all subsequent endorsees acquire only the title of the first endorsee
under the restrictive endorsement."
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0408 (1943): "An instrument negotiable in its ori,
gin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively endorsed under
the restrictive endorsement."
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under the Code as explained in the preceding section of this
article. It seems axiomatic that § 36 (2) requires that the
agency relationship be express." Thus it is possible to hold
that an indorsement in blank followed by the words "for
deposit" would not be restrictive." The words are ambiguous
and although A's purpose may be to create an agency, the
language itself does not indicate this. If agency exists it must
be shown by parol, and that seems inconsistent with other
provisions of the N.I.L. intended to prevent variation of the
written contract by parol evidence. It is entirely consistent
with the N.I.L. to call this an unqualified indorsement, and
give subsequent holders the status of due course holders. Yet
this is a common form of indorsement utilized by business
men in the vain hope that the depositary bank will be put on
notice of the indorser's rights in the instrument. On the other
hand, the indorsement "for collection" is generally conceded
to be restrictive.' Recognizing that § 36 of the N.I.L. does
not fully coincide with business practice the Code now
expressly provides that an indorsement followed by the words
"For Deposit", or "For Collection" will put the first taker on
notice and prevent him from assuming the status of a due
course holder until he has remitted for the instrument.
The second aspect of this problem involves the rights of
subsequent holders. While we might agree that the indorsement in blank, followed by the words "For Deposit", or "For
Collection" would put one who received the instrument from
the indorser on notice that this constituted an agency for
collection, if the agent advanced to the indorser the full value
in cash, it must be conceded that he stands in the shoes of
the indorser and if the latter is a holder in due course he can
1
enforce the instrument free of defenses of the maker."
Is
Britton, Bills and Notes 268 et seq. (1943).
Security Bank of Minnesota v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 58 Minn. 141, 59
N.W. 987 (1894). One possible explanation of the words "For deposit
only in X bank" is to indicate to the bank that the agent of the depositor
has only limited ower to deal with the instrument. Banks themselves no
longer use this form, having substituted the words "Pay any Bank or
Banker, prior indorsements guaranteed." This form was held non-restrictive in a North Dakota decision, First National Bank of Minneapolis v.
Wells County, 54 N.D. 502, 209 N.W. -962 (1926). The authorities are
divided as to both forms of indorsement. See Britton, op cit. supra note 68,
at 268, n.l; 270, n.3.
70 The word "collection" implies an agency for that purpose. See form of
indorsement in State v. Hanson, 55 N.D. 370, 213 N.W. 353 (1926).
, In-Continental National Bank & Trust Co. v. Stirling, 65 Ida. 123, 140
P.2d 230 (1943), it was held that where the drawer-payee indorsed an
accepted trade acceptance restrictively, and then sold the instrument to a
bank, the latter became a holder in due course on the theory that the indorser had waived the restriction. In State v. Hanson, supra note 70, a
similar result was reached by resorting to estoppel. Such circuitous reasoning results from holding that a restrictive indorsement destroys the negotiability of an instrument.

U
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there any good reason why he should not be a holder in due
course regardless of the status of the indorser? If the instrument is dishonored in the hands of the indorsee is the indorser
liable to him as an unqualified indorser? Under the doctrine
of restrictive indorsement the answer must be no-the indorsement is qualified because the indorsee receives title in trust
for collection and remittance, there is a string attached to the
interest received by the' indorsee. It follows that only for
breach of the contract of agency, aside from the doctrine of
negotiability, can the indorsee sue the indorser. There are
many decisions under the N.I.L. to the effect that the instrument becomes a simple contract after restrictive indorsement"
and apparently Section 47 of the N.I.L. bolsters that result by
stating that an instrument remains negotiable until it has
been restrictively indorsed.
This circumcision of the holder in due course principle is
not compelled by business practice in the collection of commercial paper. Conditional credits are standard in the banking
field, and it is reasonable that the collection agent should be
given a lien to the extent that actual cash has been parted
with, and to that extent the initial bank should be a holder in
due course. The same holds true of later holders in the
collection process. The form of ,the indorsement makes them
aware of an agency but it is not notice to them that a breach
of that relationship has already occurred." The Code reverses
some bad law in this area and coincides more closely with the
fundamental doctrine of holder in due course, and it accomplishes this result by abandoning the term "restrictive" and
omitting § 47.
The third form of indorsement under § 36 caused difficulty
where the rights of subsequent holders were involved. Some
courts applied §* 47 literally and held that no holder could
become a holder in due course in such a case." The mere fact
that the indorsement is in trust for a third person does not
make the indorsement and transfer to the indorsee qualified.
The rights have now passed to the beneficiary and no strings
are retained by the indorser in this case. The better view
under the N.I.L., therefore, held that the first indorsee might
become a holder in due course."3 The Code abandons the clumsy
"
"

14

is

8 Am.Jur., Bills and Notes § 545; 10 C.J.S., Bills and Notes § 214 (c).
The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when he has
reasonable grounds to believe:
(b) that a fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as
security for his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or
otherwise in breach of duty." U.C.C. § 3.304 (2).
Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93

(1919).

Atlantic City National Bank v. Commercial Lumber Co., 107 N.J.L. 492,
155 At. 762 (1931) (apparently based on estoppel).
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language of § 37 to the effect that "all subsequent indorsees
acquire only the title of the first indorsee under the restrictive
indorsement."
In conclusion, this section of the Code enlarges the holder
in due course principle to encompass the field formerly
covered by the sections of the N.I.L. dealing with restrictive
indorsements. In so doing it has attempted to harmonize
business practice in commercial collections with the due course
principle. The net result is that large areas of disagreement
in the case law have been wiped out and we can make a fresh
start. There are no longer three different- types of indorsement to deal with, but one type which may take several forms,
with a single principle to govern. Since the collection field
today is largely governed by contract or by special statute, a
restrictive form of indorsement that limited negotiability is
no longer needed, and the drafters wisely recognized this fact.
NEGOTIATION EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH IT MAY BE RESCINDED.

Section 3-207"' of the Code extends the principle of § 22"
of the N.I.L. to all types of voidable transfers. Section 22
provides:
"The indorsement or assignment of the instrument
by a corporation or by an infant passes the property
therein, notwithstanding that from want of capacity
the corporation or infant may incur no liability
thereon."
In short, this section of the code continues the policy of
extending the holder in due course principle. Since it is
familiar law that even a thief may pass on an instrument
indorsed in blank, there is nothing inconsistent in holding
that indorsements voidable for lack of capacity to contract,g
fraud," duress, mistake, or breach of trust " are sufficient to
pass title and will make the instrument enforceable by a
holder in due course against all parties except one having a

is

U.C.C. § 3-207. "(1) Negotiation is effective to transfer the instrument
although the negotiation is:
(a) made by an infant, a corporation exceeding its powers, or by any
other person without capacity; or
(b) obtained by fraud, duress, or mistake of any kind; or
(c) made in breach of duty.
(2) Except as against a subsequent holder in due course such negotiation
is subject to rescission, the declaration of a constructive trust, or any other
remedy permitted by law."
1
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0222 (1943).
" Nat. Bank of Commere v. Pick, 13 N.D. 74, 99 N.W. 63 (1904).
Drinkall v. Movious State Bank, 11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724 (1901) (apparently inconsistent with theory set out above).
Baird v. Lorenz, 57 N.D. 804, 224 N.W. 206 (1929).
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real defense under state law. As is the case under existing
law, the Code does not purport to determine which defenses
are real and which are personal. Subsection (2) of § 3-207
provides:
"Except as against a subsequent holder in due course
such negotiation is subject to recission, the declaration
of a constructive trust or any other remedy permitted
by law."
Under this section then, the indorsement and transfer,
altho void or voidable, passes title to the holder. If the
indorser has a right of recission he resorts to available
remedies under the general law of the state. This does not
represent a new policy.
As to the holder in due course, it seems clear that the
maker of a note cannot rely on a right of recission existing in
favor of a subsequent holder to shift the burden of proof an
the holder in due course issue to the shoulders of the plaintiff.
The rule is the same under the N.I.L. The last sentence in §59"
of the N.I.L. provides: "But the last-mentioned rule does not
apply in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument
prior to the acquisition of such defective title." To illustrate:
if M issues his promissory note to P, and X secures possession
and fraudulently negotiates to Y, X's fraud does not affect M,
and therefore is not available to M as a defense when Y brings
suit on the instrument. This situation, of course, must be
distinguished from the case where the fraud was practised on
M personally." Sections 60," 61," and 62! of the N.I.L. have
a direct bearing on this question so far as defenses available
to the payee are concerned. Under those sections, the maker,
drawer, and acceptor respectively admit the existence of
the payee and his capacity to indorse. These sections read
in conjunction with §§ 59 and 22 would seem to indicate a
statutory policy which requires each party to assert his own
defenses; but both before and after general adoption of the
N.I.L. in this country the cases were in conflict as to the right
of the maker to set up a defense available to a subsequent
party." The Code adopts the view that the maker can set up
only his own defenses: "Unless he has the rights of a holder
in due course any person takes the instrument subject to (d)
the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the
'8 N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0509 (1943).
2 But see Drinkall v. Movious State Bank,

11 N.D. 10, 88 N.W. 724
(1901), and compare cases cited in notes 78 and 80, supra.
" N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0601 (1943).
M N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0602 (1943).
"
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0603 (1943).
"
Britton, Bills and Notes § 160, p. 759 et seq. (1943).
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instrument acquired it by theft. The claim of any third person
to the instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to
any party liable thereon unless the third person himself
defends the action for such party."' "?
In conclusion, this section completely revises sections 22
and 59 of the N.I.L. The purpose was to make it clear that in
any case where the paper by its terms runs to a particular
person, that person may pass the title on, although his own
title is void or voidable. The section has no application in the
case of a theft, because negotiation always includes delivery,
and delivery is lacking in the theft cases. The section imposes
no liability on the party negotiating, he may assert the
defenses available to him if any exist; but remedies available
to the indorser are cut off by transfer to a holder in due
course. Here again, the results sought under the Code seem
consistent with case law, although exceptions 'exist.
REACQUISITION

The concluding' section under Part Two of Article Three
deals with the problems raised by §§ 48," 50,' and 121' of the
N.I.L. Apparently no change in existing law is intended, and
simplification of the law has been achieved by the proposed
revision.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the many
legal problems raised by §§ 48, 50 and 121 of the N.I.L., but a
brief survey will be attempted. Section 48 of the N.I.L. permits
the holder at any time to strike out indorsements not necessary to his title and relieves. from liability on the instrument
the indorser whose name is stricken and all parties subsequent
to him. The section further provides that "he is not entitled
to enforce payment thereof against any intervening party to
whom he is personally liable." This section is founded on the
basic principle that one cannot deny his own warranties. To
illustrate: if a prior party brings suit on an instrument on
which the indorsements of A, B, and C appear after the
holder's indorsement, these indorsements are not necessary
to his title and may be stricken by him, and since his liability
runs to them, whether stricken or not, he could not sue A,'
B or C.
u

U.C.C. § 3-306.
U.C.C. § 3-208: "Where an instrument is returned to or reacquired by a

prior party he may cancel any indorsement which is not necessary to his
title and reissue or further negotiate the instrument, but any intervening
party is discharged as against the reacquiring party and subsequent holders
not in due course and if his indorsement has been cancelled is discharged
as against subsequent holders in due course as well."
89 N.D. Rev. Code § 41,0419 (1943).
"
N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0421 (1943).
91 N.D. Rev.'Code § 41-0903 (1943).
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Section 50 gives an additional right to the prior party
who comes into possession of the instrument-he may reissue
it. This he can do without striking prior indorsements-but
whether he strikes them or not, the re-acquiring party cannot
go against indorsers who signed after he did since his liability
runs to these signers. The act is silent as to the rights of the
transferor.
One might wonder why the N.I.L. contains another section,
§ 121, dealing with this problem. This section speaks of
"payment" of the instrument by a secondary party. "Payment" is treated in § 882 of the N.I.L. as follows:
"Payment is made in due course when it is made at or
after the maturity of the instrument to the holder
thereof in good faith and without notice that his title
is defective."
Since the effect of payment by a primary party is to discharge
the instrument, 3 this section was added to make it clear that
where secondary parties were compelled to take up the instrument at or after maturity it was not discharged. It might be
noted here that the Code no longer requires that payment be
made in due course," a point to be developed later, and thus
one logical basis for drawing a line between acquisitions of
the instrument by prior parties disappeared. By the elimination of the word "negotiate" in § 50 and the word "payment"
used in § 121 it became possible to combine the sections without change in meaning. The use of the word "negotiate" in
this section of the Code would be objectionable because it
is inconsistent with actual business practice. Where a prior
indorser is compelled to take up an instrument because of
the default of the primary obligor there is no good reason
why the holder should indorse before retransfer. In fact his
signature in such a case would be merely an acknowledgment
of receipt of payment. A broader term than "negotiate" is
necessary and the Code takes cognizance of this by using the
phrase "returned to or reacquired by a prior party.""
Another variation between §§ 50 and 121 is of interest.
Section 121 speaks of reacquisition by a "secondary party",
.2 N.D. Rev. Code § 41-0718 (1943).
-

N.I.L. § 119 (1) (5): "A negotiable instrument is discharged:
(1) By payment in due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor;
(5) When the principal debtor becomes the holder of the instrument at
or after maturity in his own right." (Emphasis supplied).
U.C.C. § 3-603 (1): "The liability of any party is discharged to the
extent of his payment or satisfaction to the holder even though it is made
with knowledge of a claim of another person to the instrument unless
prior to such payment or satisfaction the person making the claim either
supplies indemnity deemed adequate by the party seeking the discharge or
enjoins payment or satisfaction by order of a court of competent jurisdiction in an action in which the adverse claimant and the holder are parties."
See note 88, supra.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

whereas section 50 uses the term "prior party", which of
course is a much broader term and would include the primary
obligor. The Code adopts the latter term, and hence one
question that arises in any comparison with the N.I.L. involves
the rights of a reacquiring primary party such as the maker
of a note. Under the N.I.L. a line was drawn between the
effect of "payment" before or after maturity. Where the
instrument is paid after maturity by the principal debtor, it is
discharged and all secondary parties are relieved of liability."
But payment by the principal debtor prior to maturity does
not discharge the instrument as to a holder in due course.
Since the Code discharges all intervening secondary parties
unless the taker is a holder in due course, the result is the
same. Where the instrument is overdue in the hands of the
primary party and this fact is evident on the face of the paper
there can be no subsequent holder in due course and all
intervening indorsers are discharged.
Section 121 of the N.I.L. makes two exceptions to the
rule that an instrument may be reissued by a reacquiring
secondary party:
"(1) Where it is payable to the order of a third person, and has been paid by the drawer; and
(2) Where it was made or accepted for accommodation, and has been paid by the party accommodated."
Since the section begins by stating that the instrument is not
discharged exoept in these two instances, the natural inference
is that where the drawer or the party accommodated takes
up the instrument it is discharged. Hence it would be possible
to hold that where an acceptor dishonored a trade acceptance
and the drawer was held on his contract, he could not recover
on the instrument against the acceptor because it had been
discharged. Fortunately the courts have not accepted this
view and the Code no longer speaks of discharge of the instrument in this connection-parties, not the instrument, are
discharged.
The position of the reacquiring accommodation party is
not too clear under the language of § 121. That section states
"

7

Note 93, supra. "A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged: (1) By any act which discharges the instrument.
N.I.L. § 120.
An "on or before" note is discharged when taken up by the maker prior
to the ultimate due date, Peltier v. McFerson, 67 Colo. 505, 186 Pac. 524
(1920), but there is ample authority that acquisition by the maker prior
to maturity does not prevent reissuance by him. Citizens' National Bank
v. Loranger, 163 La. 868, 113 So. 129 (1927). Cf. Mueller v. Jagerson
Fuel Co., 203 Wis. 453, 233 N.W. 633 (1930).
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that the reacquiring secondary party is "remitted to his former
rights"; but since an accommodation party lends his name to
add currency to the instrument it would appear that he neither
has nor claims any prior right therein. The cases, therefore,
have held that an accommodation party is entitled to sue the
party accommodated, whether he signed as maker, drawer,
drawee or indorser." By abandoning the phrase, "remitted
to his former rights", the Code escapes this necessity for
strained construction of ambiguous language.
In conclusion, the rights of a purchaser from a reacquiring
secondary party must be considered. It is arguable that the
reacquiring party should have the right to leave the indorsements in full effect to give the paper greater marketability."
After all §§ 50 and 121 of the N.I.L. refer only to the rights
of the reacquiring party-he cannot hold intervening indorsers
because his warranties run to them. The N.I.L. does not say
that a transferee of a prior party cannot proceed against intervening indorsers, whose names were not stricken. Would it
be reasonable to assume that the re-acquirer should have the
right to leave the indorsements in force to obtain a better
market for his paper? Even if the transfer occurs after
maturity the same arguments could be advanced. The Code
appears to give a clear rule to govern this problem by providing that "any intervening party is discharged as against the
reacquiring party and subsequent holders not in due course
and if his indorsement has been cancelled is discharged against
subsequent holders in due course as well." The Code adopts
the theory that the rights of a subsequent transferee either
before or after maturity cannot rise higher than the known
rights of his transferor. This view accords with the common
sense of the situation. A holder who takes with notice that
secondary parties are discharged as to his transferor is not in
a position to complain."
(To Be Continued) -

10

Cuesta, Rey 6 Co. v. Newson, 102 Fla. 853, 136 So. 551 (1931).
Lillv. Gleason, 92 Kan. 754, 142 Pac. 287 (1915). Cf. as to rights of
surety co-maker to sue principal debtor, O'Neal v. Stuart, 281 Fed. 715
(6th Cir. 1922); Fox v. Kroeger, 119 Tex. 511, 35 S.W.2d 679 (1931).
Chafee, Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument by a Prior Party, 21
Col.L.Rev. 538 (1921).
State Finance Corp. v. Pisterino, 245 Mass. 402, 139 N.E. 653 (1923),
would not be good law under the code. The fact that the instrument was
in the hands of a prior party should have put the purchaser on notice that
intervening indorsers were discharged. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-305 (2) (e): "To
the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes the instrument
free from: . . .
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except ...
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument."
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